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found that observation coupled with feedback significantly increases dictators' propositions, while no 
significant effect is found for observation-only. We conclude that regard by others matters only if it is 
linked to social factors such as communication. This complements the literature that argues that 
altruistic behavior is instrumental in serving other selfish (or non-purely altruistic) ends such as self-
reputation or social approval. This experiment contributes to the growing literature aimed at 
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ANSWERS TO REVIEWERS AND REVISIONS 
 
 
Answers to REVIEWER 1 
 
Some elements concerning possible theoretical foundations of social disapproval have been 
introduced in the introduction. 
 
Xiao and Houser (2009) is indeed an important existing reference, which has been added in 
the list of references. Actually, it was already included and cited in its WP version as  
Xiao, E. & Houser, D. (2007).Emotion expression and fairness in economic exchange, 
Discussion Paper, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES), George Mason 
University. http://repec.ices-gmu.org/RePEc/pdf/1004.pdf. 
 
 
Answers to REVIEWER 2 following the structure of the review 
 
2. MAJOR COMMENTS 
 
2.1. Theoretical arguments 
 
Concerning the analogy with the impartial spectator of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments 
 
Answer to the reviewer: We agree that it is a concept that is more related to moral norms than 
to social norms (such as fairness as in our case). However, we consider that the analogy is 
relevant since what our results show is that individuals modify their behavior only by 
anticipating the feedback of the third-party (remember it is a one-shot game). There is no need 
of social interactions as in the case of the impartial spectator.  
 
Concerning the difference between social distance and anonymity 
 
Footnote 3 has been amended in order to stress the difference between social distance and 
anonymity. Part of former footnote 3 (i.e., the part mentioning only references that are more 
directly linked to our work) has been converted to plain text. The list of references referring to 
well-known developments on social preferences has been dropped (Sobel 2007, Charness and 
Rabin 2005, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Andreoni and Miller, 2002). 
 
Concerning the socialization effect 
Answer to the reviewer:   
We did not insist on the theoretical foundation of the “socialization effect” since we found no 
effect of modifying the sequence “attribution of roles then matching within groups or the 
other way around”. Furthermore the term is somewhat misleading. We in fact simply refer to 
the idea of an order effect that may reduce the social distance between subjects belonging to 
the same group. 
Footnote 9 (former footnote 6) has been therefore revised by adding the references suggested 
by the reviewer (Luhan et al. 2009, Franzen and Pointer 2013) that show contrasting results as 
regard to the existence of a socialization effect in group dictator games. 
 
 
*Response to Reviewers
2.2. Experimental design and participants 
 
2.3. Reporting of results 
 
The 66 observations of the post-play intentions do not correspond to specific treatments but 
are linked with the observation with feedback ones. Accordingly we have 66 x 2 = 132 
subjects for the control treatments, 66 x 3 x 2 = 198 for the observation only treatments and 
66 x 3 x 2 = 198 for the observation with feedback treatments. That means that 528 subjects 
have been concerned by our experiments. F’ corresponds to what the subjects would have 
been given if they would to play again. Accordingly the design is a between one but for those 
sessions. 
We add t-tests in appendix C. The differences between treatments O and F and C and 
F are statistically significant. 
As for table 1, the percentages are adjusted (1 subject corresponds to an exact percentage of 
1.51515151515152). 15 subjects gave 3 in the observation only treatment. The exact percentage 
is then 22.7272727272727. We have adjusted it to 22.73%.  
As for the treatment C, thank you, you are right; the values were not correctly reported. 
Accordingly table 1 has been modified. Our results however do not changed because they are 
calculated with the right values. The fact that 33.33% of the subjects given half or more of their 
endowment is in line with Andreoni and Bernheim (2009). 
We agree with the fact that the averages of the gifts in the control and observation 
only treatments are equal up to the 6
th
 position after the decimal point has an almost nil 
probability to appear. It is however the case. 
We changed the regression according to your advice. 
 
 
 
Minor comments 
 x P. 3/4: The reference to Mohlin and Johannesson (208) has been dropped since it is an 
example for the reduction of social distance as communication is introduced ex ante. 
 x Footnote 7 (p. 10) now footnote 9 (p. 10) has been reworded for clarity. By ‘very fast’ 
formation, we mean that subjects are passive (they read on the computer that they are 
going to be matched with two others) and have not the time to realize (due to the speed 
of the flow information they are subject to) that have been grouped. 
 x Figure 2/figure 3 has been standardized 
 x p. 12. The cross-reference has been revised. It refers to footnote 6 instead of footnote 
1. 
 x We removed a figure ( the histograms of the results) and an appendix 
 x Figure 5 that becomes figure 4 has been changed according to your advice. 
 x We have changed the regression (we ran a tobit one) and put the SD in parentheses 
 x The typo error (Johanensson instead of Johannesson) has been corrected 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Highlights  
x we study the role of observation and sanction on individual behavior x observation is provided by introducing a third-party in a dictator game x sanction is provided by means of a written feedback from the receiver in a dictator 
game  x we show that observation alone has no effect on behavior x observation with feedback increases the generosity of dictators   
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As early as 1759 Adam Smith, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, emphasized the social 
approbation and disapprobation dimensions of individual behavior: “we are pleased to think 
that we have rendered ourselves the natural objects of approbation (…) and we are mortified 
to reflect that we have just merited the blame of those we live with.” (Smith, 1976 [1759], p. 
116). Moreover, he pointed out that this dimension is intrinsically intertwined with a related 
self-image notion, i.e., self-approbation or self-esteem: “[w]e endeavour to examine our own 
conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it. If, upon 
placing ourselves into his [the impartial spectator’s] situation, we thoroughly enter into all the 
passions and motives which influenced it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation 
of this supposed equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into his disapprobation, and condemn 
it.” (Ibid, p. 110). Smith also emphasized that conscious feelings such as praise or blame, play 
a key role in the process of approbation or disapprobation of the conduct of others, and in 
turn, our self-approbation or self-disapprobation
1
.  
A related idea emerges in social psychology in the work by Cooley (1902) who coined the 
phrase ‘looking-glass self’, meaning that a person’s self grows out of society’s interpersonal 
interactions and the perceptions of others. The term refers to people shaping themselves based 
on other people’s perceptions, which leads to a reinforcement of other people’s perspectives 
on themselves. Recently, this notion was formalized by Bénabou and Tirole (2003) among 
others, using a principal-agent framework, and analyzing the consequences of such a 
‘looking-glass self’ effect in terms of costs2. The motive of social approbation has also been 
proposed by economists who do not consider that emotions such as shame or guilt which play 
a highly complementary role in maintaining one’s commitments, can be reduced to costs to be 
avoided. For Elster (1999, 281-3), shame is defined in terms of the ‘action tendencies’ it is 
                                                          
1
 We agree with one reviewer that the impartial spectator is a concept that is related more to moral norms of the 
kind discussed by Immanuel Kant (moral imperative) than to social norms such as fairness, which are considered 
in our experiment. 
2
 This approach is in line with Becker (1996). 
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like to produce, and involves a commitment to certain principles, standards, or norms. This 
echoes references in the psychological literature to anticipatory shame (see Tracy et al. 2007). 
In a nutshell, anticipatory shame (in contrast to exposed shamed) is felt by the actor, in the 
absence of exposure, by imagining how he (or she) would feel were his (or her) normative 
transgression exposed. Our results are consistent with the idea that anticipatory shame plays a 
crucial role in shaping behaviour in a dictator game (DG) experiment.  
 
In order to test for the role of social approval on altruistic behavior, we try to disentangle the 
intertwining influences of observation-only and observation coupled with ex post 
communication. We use a (one-shot) DG framework where the influence of social factors is 
manipulated via the introduction of a neutral third-party subject who 1) is incentivized 
independently of any of the randomly matched partners of the DG, and 2) either silently 
observes or observes and is required to give ex post written feedback to the giver. 
The observation-only treatment can be related to several contributions on the effects of 
observation in experiments in economics and cognitive psychology. The seminal work of 
Hoffman et al. (1994) on dictator and ultimatum, testing the anonymity hypothesis by using a 
double-blind design, suggests that “other-regarding preferences may have an overwhelming 
social, what-do-other-know component” so that fairness may not be one’s own preference but 
a derivative of the judgment of others (Hoffman et al. 1994, p. 371). Some recent work argues 
that selfish concerns such as guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg 2006) and self-image maintenance through self-signaling (Bodner and Prelec 
2003) or self-deception (Dana et al. 2006 and 2007), can help explain seemingly altruistic 
behavior.  
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Other theoretical contributions on social or interdependent preferences explore the suggestion 
that altruistic behavior can be promoted by reducing social distance
3
 (Hoffman et al. 1996). 
This literature offers several means to manipulate social distance: by making potential victims 
of selfishness more identifiable (cf. Schelling 1968 on the ‘identifiable victim effect’) through 
the use of photographs (Burnham 2003), by contrasting varying kinds (one-way/both ways, 
silent/non silent) of identification (Bohnet and Frey 2001a et 2001b), by using tacit visual or 
auditing clues (Haley and Fessler 2005, Bateson et al. 2006, Nettle et al. 2013) or simulating 
an audience effect by varying the probability of nature to play (Andreoni and Bernheim 
2009).  
Another strand in the related literature addresses the role of third-party informal punishment, 
via social approval or disapproval, for guiding behavior. Although indirectly linked to the 
literature on the disciplinary effect of third-party punishment in games (Fehr and Fischbacher 
2004), our experimental setting departs company from it since it involves 1) informal and non 
pecuniary punishment, and 2) communication (at least anticipated). From this standpoint, it is 
more in line with the economic and psychology literature which has established that informal 
sanctions such as communication, permitting the expression of disapproval, can favor pro-
social behaviors. For instance, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) provide a one-shot dictator 
experiment in which they compare a feedback treatment - i.e. a treatment where an 
anonymous verbal written message is sent by the recipient to the proposer after the pass, with 
a no feedback treatment, and show that anticipated rewards induce altruistic behavior. Xiao 
and Houser (2009) find similar results although there are more restrictions in their 
experimental design on the amount to pass (e.g. the divider cannot take more than 90%) and 
on the content of the feedback written message. In a DG, Andreoni and Rao (2011) show that 
                                                          
3
 Social distance need to be distinguished from anonymity. Hoffman et al. (1996, p. 654) propose that social 
distance means a “sense of coupling between dictator and his or her counterpart.” In contrast, anonymity of 
subjects circumvents that experimenters and/other participants find something out about the subject’s decision. 
Koch and Normann (2008) try to disentangle the effect of regard for others from the effect of regard by others.  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
5 
 
when the receiver can speak the dictator is more generous compared to the case when only the 
dictator speaks. Xiao and Houser (2005) find complementary results in ultimatum games. 
They show that ex-post verbal written feedback messages by receivers significantly decrease 
the likelihood of rejecting unfair results. This suggests that verbal written communication is 
an expression of disapproval, which can be a non-costly substitute for monetary punishment. 
In the same vein, Xiao (2012) shows that in a one-shot anonymous interaction, compared with 
the case when the behavior is simply observed by the audience, individuals are more likely to 
act on what they believe the other thinks they should do (a proxy for social approval), and 
therefore are more reluctant to violate social norms when they have to provide the audience 
with justification for their decisions. The explanation provided by the author is that 
justification makes social norms more salient to the subjects than observation by the audience 
only. Finally, Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) find limited support for lying aversion and 
guilt aversion
4
. 
In order to test the respective role of observation and social disapproval, we provide a 
framework that permits us to disentangle those two effects and to clarify their underlying 
motivations. To our knowledge, this is the first study to isolate the impact of observation with 
ex post feedback from the impact of observation-only. Moreover, it is the only contribution to 
deal with feedback communication from a third-party
5
. The paper is organized as follows. In 
section 2 we present the experimental design and procedures. Section 3 provides the results, 
which are discussed in section 4. The paper concludes in section 5. 
 
2. Experimental design and procedures 
                                                          
4
 They add to Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) a ‘bare promises’ treatment where the second player, before the 
game, can send a message to the first, either ‘I promise to choose Roll’ (playing the die) or a blank message. 
5
 In contrast to Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008), we avoid a possible reciprocal effect on the receiver’s 
feedback just because the third party is not directly concerned by the dictator’s donation.  
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In order to avoid both reputational effects due to repeated games and conditional reciprocity 
(i.e. reciprocal motivations based on future material payoffs), we conduct a one-shot 
anonymous DG experiment with and without ex post communication from a third-party which 
we call the observer. Regarding the role of observation-only, the motivation for our design is 
to test whether the introduction of a neutral observer randomly chosen among the subjects, 
has any effect in addition to the hypothetical effect of observation by the experimenter (see 
Levitt and List, 2007 on the scrutiny effect). A DG was chosen in preference to the more 
popular ultimatum game in order to avoid confounding altruism with risk aversion or false 
beliefs. Feedback from a non incentivized third-party is chosen over feedback by the recipient 
in order to avoid outcome-oriented punishment.  
Ex-post communication takes the form of an anonymous, closed-form
6
 written message 
consisting of a list of 7 possible messages to be sent to the dictator by the third-party (the 
observer), ranked from 1 to 7 according to the degree of (dis)approval of the dictator’s 
donation expressed by the observer. ‘bastardo’ (1) (bastard in Italian) is very harsh while 
‘bravissimo’ (7), meaning ‘this is very nice of you’, is the kindest message. The item ‘nessuno 
commento’, or no comment, has the value 0 and corresponds to cases where the third-party 
chooses not to send any feedback. We experienced only 8 cases of no feedback. The screen 
seen by subjects appears as follows: 
[Screen 1 – around here] 
 
 
We ran three ‘between’ treatments in order to distinguish between the observation effect and 
the social disapproval effect. The first treatment (C) is a standard DG (control treatment). The 
second treatment (O) is a DG with an observer informed about the allocator’s  donation 
(observation-only treatment). The third treatment (F) allows the observer to send written 
                                                          
6
 We chose closed-form messages in particular because we wanted to create a proxy for the evaluation intensity 
of observers (see below). In order to reduce the dimensional problem, we selected messages whose intervals 
were dimensionally similar to 1 ECU. The value of ‘bravissimo’ is comparable to 7 ECU. 
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feedback to the dictator (observation with feedback treatment). In the F treatment, the dictator 
is asked also how much he/she would keep were he/she to have the opportunity to play again. 
That is, the allocators are informed about the content of the feedback message from the 
observer attached to their group (e.g., in the screen below ‘taccagno’ means ‘stingy’) and then 
decide how much of their total endowment they would expend if they had the opportunity to 
replay. The response to this question provides some information that allows us to evaluate 
what we call ‘ex post feedback effects’ (see below). 
 
[screen 2 – around here] 
In order to test for the existence of a socialization effect
7
, we ran two variants of each 
treatment with different subjects. We hypothesized that the order in which subjects are 
randomly matched in pairs (for the control treatment) or groups of three (for treatments O and 
F) and attributed a role, might matter. The intuition is that grouping subjects first might 
decrease the social distance, and therefore affect the behavior of the allocators. We ran 
variants of each treatments in which subjects first were randomly matched in pairs or groups 
of three, and then attributed a role (proposer, recipient or possibly observer); and vice versa, 
that is subjects were first attributed a role and then matched into pairs or groups of three. We 
labeled these experiments C1, O1, and F1 respectively for the first variant, and C2, O2, and 
F2 for the second variant. (See instructions in appendix A.) 
The experiment was conducted in October 2011 at the “Centro Sperimentale A Roma 
Est”  (CESARE)  on one of the campus locations of the LUISS Guido Carli University in 
                                                          
7
 The idea that grouping subjects in a DG might influence donations by dictators was introduced by Cason and 
Mui (1997). They compared an individual DG where the dictator decides to transfer an amount of y to the 
recipient, with a team DG where two subjects dictate a donation of 2y to be transferred. The results showed that 
there was group polarization in the latter context and the data indicated that team choices tended to be dominated 
by the more other-regarding member. However, other studies of DGs show contrasting results, i.e., an egoistic 
shift (Luhan et al. 2009), or no significant difference between single and group decisions (Franzen and Pointner 
2014).  
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Rome. The subjects were recruited by e-mail using ORSEE (Online Recruitment System for 
Economic Experiments, devised by Ben Greiner at the University of New South Wales in 
1994). They were randomly allocated among the six treatments and we ran 18 sessions (6 
each for the control, observation-only, and observation with feedback treatments). A total of 
528 subjects participated in the experiment yielding 198 pairs or trios of observations (66 
pairs of observations for the control treatments, 66 trios of observations for the observation-
only treatments, and 66 trios of observations for the observation with feedback treatments). 
We also obtained 66 observations
8
 linked to the observation with feedback treatments that 
correspond to the post-play intentions of donations of allocators after receiving feedback from 
the observer. 
Subjects in pairs or groups of three were anonymous to one another, and the decision of one 
subject was observable only by the receiver and the observer of his or her specific group of 
three but not by the other subjects. The instructions (translated from Italian) of the treatments 
C1, O1 and F2 are given in appendix A (remember that treatments indexed by 1 differ from 
those indexed by 2 only in relation to the order in which subjects were matched into pairs or 
groups of three and attributed the roles of proposer, recipient, or observer). At the end of the 
experiment, participants were asked to complete an anonymous questionnaire (professional 
status, discipline, age, gender). Finally, subjects were called one by one by the experimenter 
in order to be paid privately before leaving the lab. 
The amount of the show-up was 3 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit), and the 
endowment of allocators 6 ECU. The observer was given a fixed amount of 6 ECU. The final 
gains were calculated in euros at a conversion rate of 1 ECU equals 1 euro. The minimum and 
                                                          
8
 These observations do not correspond to specific treatments but are linked to the observation with feedback 
treatment. 
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maximum gains were respectively 3 euros and 9 euros. The average time of the experiments 
was 15 minutes. 
  
3. Results 
 Dictators pass an average 1.98 for all treatments taken together (33% of the dictators’ 
endowment). In treatment C, the mean is 1.78 with a standard deviation (SD) equal to 1.38, in 
treatment O it is 1.78 (SD = 1.45) and in treatment F it is 2.37 (SD = 1.65). Intentions of 
allocations by dictator after receiving the feedback message from the observer (F’) amounts to 
2.22 (SD=1.89) (see figure 1). The donations go from 29.7% of the endowment in control and 
silent observation, to 39.5% in the treatment with feedback, i.e., that is, donations increase by 
33.1% from the two first treatments to the feedback treatment. 
[Figure 1 – around here] 
Table 1 presents the gifts as percentages for the different treatments. Descriptive statistics are 
provided in appendix B. 
[Table 1 – around here] 
 
A Mann-Whitney test shows that there is no significant socialization effect. Recall that 
we defined this effect in relation to the order in which subjects were matched into groups of 
two or three and attributed roles. The absence of a significant socialization effect therefore, 
means that the order of the sequence of grouping and attributing roles does not modify the 
behavior of allocators substantially
9
. However, the Mann-Whitney test reveals that, if there is 
                                                          
9
 One possible explanation for the absence of a socialization effect might be that the random procedure we use to 
form groups in the experiment is ‘very fast’, not self-involving and does not seem to catch the subject’s 
attention. More precisely, subjects are passive (they hear and read on the computer that they are going to be 
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a significant difference between the amounts given by the proposers in treatments F and O, 
this difference is not significant when we compare treatments C and O (see appendix C). 
Those results are corroborated by the t-tests (see appendix C).  
Since there is no significant socialization effect, data are aggregated over treatments O1 and 
O2, over C1 and C2, as well as over F1 and F2, to give treatments C, O and F respectively. 
All the remaining statistics are derived from these aggregated treatments. 
Interestingly, as Figure 2 illustrates, the percentages of donations in treatment F show 
a different distribution from those in treatments O and C. That is, the percentages of donations 
under the 50:50 norm (i.e., when donations are strictly less than 3 or up to 2) are 
systematically lower in the F treatment than in the C and O treatments, while the percentages 
of donations over the 50:50 norm (i.e., when donations are strictly more than 3 or 4 and over) 
are systematically higher in the F treatment than in the C and O treatments
10
. An unusual 
result is that the percentage of subjects giving more than half of their endowment is high (9% 
for treatment C and 18% for treatment F). This result is difficult to explain. As for treatment 
F, concerning those choices the messages received have an average value of 4.6. Moreover 
the correlation between the value of the messages received and the amount of money the 
proposers would have sent if they would have to play again equals 0.52, although the 
correlation between the value of the messages and the amount sent during the game is -0.39 
and the correlation between the amount sent during the game and the amount of money the 
proposers would have sent if they would have to play again is -0.28. Accordingly a possible 
explanation is that people giving more than half of their endowment want, ex ante to test the 
fairness of the received message and because it is not the case they consequently reduce the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
matched with one or two other subjects) and have not the time to realize (due to the speed of the flow 
information they are subjected to) that they have been grouped.  
 
 
10
 42% of the offers are equal at least to 3 in the observation with feedback treatment (F) while they respectively 
reach 35% and 32% in the control (C) and observation-only (O) treatments. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
11 
 
amount they would have given if they would have played another time. This explanation is 
however only a rough one and we have to admit that facts are sometimes rebel.”   
[Figure 2 – around here] 
For the observation with feedback treatment (F), the mean of the amount that the 
proposer would have retained had he/she the opportunity to replay, is significantly higher 
(3.77) than the amount he/she effectively retained during the game (3.22). As for the message, 
only 36.36 percent of the messages sent were ‘soft’ (i.e., ranked from 4 up to 7). 
As hinted in footnote 6, we constructed a proxy variable in order to capture the 
intensity of evaluation of observers, defined as the difference between the degree of 
(dis)approval of the message sent by the observer (scaled from 1 to 7) and the effective 
amount of the donation (scaled from 0 to 6). Therefore, the intensity of evaluation of 
observers thus defined can take values from -5 (a seemingly excessive level of disapproval) to 
7 (a seemingly excessive level of approval) (see appendix D). Following this logic, we 
consider that the value of a ‘balanced’ or ‘objective’ intensity of evaluation corresponds to1. 
The percentages of the different values taken by the intensity of evaluation are shown in 
figure 3. 
[Figure 3 – around here] 
The student t-test
11
 shows that the mean of the distribution of the evaluation intensities 
(EI) is significant and equals 1
12
. This means that the evaluations by observers are balanced, 
i.e., the content of the feedback messages is close to the ‘objective’ one. 
                                                          
Te 
11
 We used the Skewness-Kurtosis test to control for whether the distribution of intensities of evaluation is 
normal (Prob> chi2 = .81). 
12
 The student t-test gives: Pr(|T|>|t|) = 0.019 confidence interval: [-.3587919, .8739434]. 
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The amount the proposer would have given, had he/she had the opportunity to play 
again (moneygiven2) and the amount that he/she effectively gave during the game 
(moneygiven1) are significantly different (Pr(|T > |t|) = 0.0230) 
We run a Tobit regression (to account for left-censored dependent variable) of the 
amount the proposer would have given had he/she had the opportunity to play again 
(moneygiven2) on an interaction variable (the amount effectively given (moneygiven1) times 
the message), and we obtain a significant coefficient (see appendix E)
 13
. 
This means that the interaction between the feedbacks combined with the amounts the 
proposer gave during the game, impact on his (or her) virtual choices. Figure 4 illustrates the 
proposers’ percentages as a function of the amount they would have given if they had the 
opportunity to play again, and the percentages of the various degrees of disapproval of the 
messages the proposers received. It shows that if the messages received are soft (from 4 to 6), 
the amount of money the proposers would have given had they had the opportunity to play 
again is low. If the messages are hard (from 1 to 3) the opposite holds: the amount of money 
the proposers would have given if they had had the opportunity to play again is high. Thus 
there is a discontinuity between messages 3 and 4. 
[Figure 4 – around here] 
This result is interesting and rather intuitive although it should be taken with caution 
since it relates to cost-free intentions which could be suspected of hypocrisy. However, this 
result suggests that the feedback has an ex post effect since proposers intend to give more if 
they receive a harsh message. This result needs to be mitigated. Figure 4 shows that dictators 
give more if the message is strong and give less if the message is soft.  
Discussion 
                                                          
13
 This idea was suggested by one of the journal reviewers. 
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Our experiments allow discussions of five theoretical elements: the first concerns the 
influence of social distance on individual behavior; the second is linked to the impact of 
observation on behaviors; the third is due to the possible effect of anticipated sanctions on 
individual decisions; the fourth concerns the evaluation intensity of the message; and the fifth 
refers to the possible ex post effect of a sanction. 
In relation to the first issue, we argued in the introduction that altruistic behavior may 
be promoted by decreasing social distance, as suggested by Hoffman et al. (1996). Our results 
do not seem to corroborate this hypothesis since we found no differences in terms of dictators’ 
decisions of gift if they are first matched with others and then ascribed the role of dictator or 
vice versa. The apparent absence of any socialization effect may be explained by a limited 
attention effect. If we assume that people pay attention to information conditional on its 
salience, our design could be criticized for giving insufficient salience to the difference in the 
order of the sequence presented above. This explanation could be complemented by another 
one. The degree of social distance is not a 0-1 variable. In our experiment, the difference in 
social distance between the two versions of a given treatment appears very small. Thus, it is 
not surprising that such a small perturbation of social distance has no discernible effect on the 
amount retained. 
In relation to the second issue, we also argue in the introduction that social factors 
such as observation, underpin social interactions so that would-be altruistic behavior may be 
the efficient response to the perceived situation. The results of our experiments do not support 
this claim since we found no significant effect of observation-only. But the absence of 
significance in the differences between the means of donations in treatments C and O may be 
due to the fact that we ran one-shot experiments. However, it corroborates the idea developed 
by Levitt and List (2007) that the presence of an experimenter impacts on the subjects’ 
behavior. The presence of a silent observer replicates the presence of an experimenter, and 
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therefore we should not expect any additional effect of observation by a third-party. Another 
interpretation might be that at least some of the allocators have some internalized social 
norms which induce them to transfer an amount significantly different from zero. This may 
explain why the presence of an observer does not have a significant impact on donations. 
Moreover, since subjects have no information concerning the status of the observer, it is 
impossible for them to infer his/her opinion or his/her preferences in terms of fairness for 
instance. Taking account of this uncertainty might explain why observation-only is not 
sufficient to have an impact on behavior. 
From this standpoint, and with reference to the third theoretical element listed above, 
introducing the possibility – which is common knowledge – of a feedback removes the 
uncertainty and makes the role of the observer explicit or more salient, and therefore 
effective. This suggests that in our experiment, observation by others matters only if it is 
complemented by the likelihood of disapproval. This is in line with findings in cognitive 
psychology that perception can be even more powerful than ‘reality’ insofar as people use 
cues or heuristics to evaluate the likelihood that their actions are observable, and possibly 
disapproved. The existence of feedback therefore is a deciding factor in order for the 
proposers to know particulars about the third party (or to infer how this third-party thinks they 
are or should be), not directly concerned by the proposer’s decision of donation as is the case 
in Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008). In other words, the anticipated feedback is a means of 
engineering altruism (see Burnham, 2003). The fact that proposers consequently adjust their 
behavior should come as no surprise. The feedback effect is economically relevant since it 
indicates that individuals are sensitive to anticipated possible sanctions. This suggests that 
feedbacks are non-costly substitutes for effective pecuniary sanctions. 
 Fourth, the results obtained with the proxy variable for the intensity of evaluation of 
observers plead for an interpretation related to reciprocity. Feedbacks are essentially 
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‘balanced’, i.e., they are consistent with the assumption that the degree of approval is 
proportional to the generosity of the proposer, so that observers reciprocate proposers’ 
donations ‘fairly’. 
 Fifth, the fact that the degree of disapproval of messages has an impact on the amount 
the dictator would have given had he/she had the opportunity to replay, is interesting due to 
the positive relationships between the two
14
. In other words, the softer the message (from 
level 4 to level 7), the less the amount the dictator would have given if he had played one 
more time. Conversely, the harsher the message (from leve1 1 to level 3), the higher would be 
this amount. This result supports an interpretation of the feedback acting as a slightly complex 
disciplinary device. 
4. Conclusion  
This contribution which complements Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) by introducing a 
third-party feedback, could be extended by new experiments: where the proposer plays a real 
(as compared to a virtual) second game after receiving feedback, which would corroborate our 
results concerning the amount retained by the proposer after the feedback has been received; 
or where a treatment is compared with the feedback from the recipient (as in Ellingsen and 
Johannesson, 2008) and a treatment with feedback from a third party (our own contribution). 
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Appendix A 
Instructions are translated from Italian, the language in which they were delivered. 
They were posted on the subjects’ screens and read out aloud by a randomly selected 
subject. 
Instructions of treatment C1 [i.e., the control treatment where groups are formed first 
and then roles are attributed using random procedures]  
Welcome. You have agreed to participate to an experiment at the end of which you will 
receive at least a show-up fee of 3 euro. You may get more than this depending on your 
performance during the experiment. The total amount gained will be given to you at the end 
of the experiment. At the end of the experiment, before being paid you will be asked to 
complete an anonymous questionnaire (level of studies, gender, etc.). 
1. Determining the pairs 
During the experiment you will be matched randomly in groups of two persons. You will not 
know the identity of the other member of your pair, either during or after the experiment. 
2. Determining roles. 
You will be randomly assigned to the role of proposer (A) or receiver (B). Each proposer has 
an amount of 6 euro and has the possibility to transfer part of this amount to the receiver with 
whom he/she is matched. (For example, if A decides to transfer 2 euro to B, he or she types 
the amount in euro that he or she has decided to keep, namely, 4 euro). 
 
Instructions for treatment O1 [i.e., the treatment with observation alone where first 
groups are formed and then roles are attributed using random procedures]  
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Welcome. You have agreed to participate in an experiment at the end of which you will 
receive a show-up fee of 3 euro. You may earn more depending on your performance during 
the experiment. The total amount of your gain will be given to you at the end of the 
experiment. At the end of the experiment, before being paid, you will be asked to complete an 
anonymous questionnaire (level of studies, gender, etc.). 
1. Determining the groups of three  
During the experiment you will be matched randomly in groups of three persons. You will not 
know the identity of the members of your group either during or after the experiment. 
2. Determining roles. 
You will be randomly assigned the role of proposer (A), receiver (B), or observer (C). Each 
proposer has an amount of 6 euro and the possibility to transfer part of this amount to the 
receiver with whom he/she is matched. C receives a fixed amount of 3 euro in addition to the 
show-up fee. (For example, if A decides to transfer 2 euro to B, he/she types in the amount in 
euro he or she has decided to keep, namely, 4 euro). The observer of his or her group is 
immediately notified of the amount. 
Instructions for treatment F2 [i.e., the treatment with observation and feedback where 
roles are attributed and then the groups formed using random procedures] 
Welcome. You have agreed to participate in an experiment at the end of which you will 
receive a show-up fee of 3 euro. You may earn more depending on your performance during 
the experiment. The total amount of your gains will be given to you at the end of the 
experiment. At the end of the experiment, before being paid you will be asked to complete an 
anonymous questionnaire (level of studies, gender, etc.). 
 
1. Determining roles 
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During this experiment, you will be randomly assigned the role of proposer (A), receiver (B), 
or observer (C). You will not know the roles of the members of group to which you belong 
either during or after the experiment. Each proposer has an amount of 6 euro and has the 
possibility to transfer part of this amount to the receiver to whom he/she is matched. C knows 
what amount is transferred by A to B, and has the possibility to send a written message to A 
to offer his/her opinion concerning the amount transferred. C receives a fixed amount of 3 
euro in addition to the show-up fee. 
A is then asked to decide the amount he/she would like to keep were he/she given the 
opportunity to replay. 
2. Determining the groups of three 
You will now be matched randomly in a group of three persons consisting of one proposer 
(A), one receiver (B), and one observer (C).  
Each proposer (A) decides how much he/she is willing to transfer to the receiver (B) in his or 
her group. (For example, if A decides to transfer 2 euro to B, he/she types the amount in euro 
he/she has decided to keep, namely, 4 euro). The observer (C) in his or her group is 
immediately notified of the amount. C has the possibility to send a written message to A to 
offer his/her opinion concerning the amount transferred. C receives a fixed amount of 3 euro 
in addition to the show-up fee. 
A is then asked to decide the amount he/she would like to keep were he/she given the 
opportunity to replay. 
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Appendix B – Descriptive statistics  
Variables observations Mean std. dev. min Max 
gift C 66 1.787879 1.386919 0 6 
gift O 66 1.787879 1.45195 0 6 
gift F 66 2.378788 1.652645 0 6 
gift F’ 66 2.227273 1.895707 0 6 
 
Variables gift C gift O gift F gift F’ 
gift C 1.0000    
gift O -.1220 1.0000   
gift F .0557 -.1391 1.0000  
gift F’ .0596 -.0716 .3257 1.0000 
Correlations matrix 
Appendix C 
Significance tests 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
giftC giftO     obs rank sum expected 
1  66 4419  4389 
2  66 4359  4389 
combined 132 8778  8778 
H0: giftC = giftO 
z  = 0.140 
Prob > |z| = 0.8886  H0 cannot be rejected 
 
Significance of the difference between gift C and gift O. 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test 
giftO giftF     obs rank sum expected 
1  66 3941  4389 
2  66 4837  4389 
combined 132 8778  8778 
H0: giftO = giftF 
z  = -2.084 
Prob > |z| = 0.0372  H0 can be rejected 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
23 
 
Significance of the difference between gift O and gift F 
T-tests 
ttest giftC = giftO 
Paired t test 
__________________________________________________________  
Variable Obs    Mean         Std. Err.   Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
__________________________________________________________  
giftC       66    1.787879    .1707179    1.386919 1.446932    2.128826 
giftO       66    1.787879    .1787227     1.45195 1.430945    2.144813 
__________________________________________________________  
diff          66           0         .2617852    2.126753 -.5228211    .5228211 
__________________________________________________________ 
mean(diff) = mean(giftC - giftO)    t =   0.0000 
Ho: mean(diff) = 0                               degrees of freedom = 65 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.5000            Pr(T > t) = 1.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.5000 
 
ttest giftO = gifF 
Paired t test 
__________________________________________________________  
Variable Obs    Mean        Std. Err.   Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
__________________________________________________________  
giftO      66    1.787879    .1787227     1.45195 1.430945    2.144813 
giftF       66    2.378788    .2034265    1.652645 1.972517    2.785059 
__________________________________________________________  
diff         66    -.5909091    .2888586    2.346698 -1.1678      -.0140186 
__________________________________________________________  
mean(diff) = mean(giftO - giftF)    t =  -2.0457 
Ho: mean(diff) = 0                               degrees of freedom = 65 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0224          Pr(T > t) = 0.0448 Pr(T > t) = 0.9776 
 
ttest giftC = gifF 
Paired t test 
__________________________________________________________  
Variable Obs    Mean         Std. Err.   Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
__________________________________________________________  
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giftC       66    1.787879    .1707179    1.386919 1.446932    2.128826 
giftF        66    2.378788    .2034265    1.652645 1.972517    2.785059 
__________________________________________________________  
diff         66    -.5909091    .2581784    2.097451 -1.106527   -.0752913 
__________________________________________________________  
mean(diff) = mean(giftC - gifF)    t =  -2.2888 
Ho: mean(diff) = 0                               degrees of freedom =  65 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0           Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha: mean (diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0127            Pr(T > t) = 0.0254 Pr(T > t) = 0.9873 
 
Appendix D 
Generosity 
      
      
 
Kindness 
      
      
 
Evaluation intensity = Kindness –Generosity 
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Proxy of the evaluation intensity 
Appendix E 
___________________________________________________________________________
moneygiven2 
model 
interact    0.0731** 
      (0.025) 
cons      0.718* 
     (0.354) 
sigma 
cons     1.618*** 
N     58 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
Tobit regression of moneygiven2 an interaction variable (moneygiven1 time message) 
 
 
  
Screen 1:  The feedback message stage. Translation of the list of items is as follows: Nessun 
commento: no comment; bastardo: bastard; taccagno : stingy; non è carino da parte tua: 
that’s not nice of yours; vabene ma potrevi fare meglio: OK but could do better; può andare: 
it’s OK; bravo: nice of yours; brassimimo: very nice of yours. 
 
 
 
 
Screen  2:  Dictator’s  intentions  of  donations  after  getting  the  feedback  message. 
Translation of the screen is as follows: MESSAGE OF THE OBSERVER. The observer of 
your group decided to send you the following feedback message in order to give his/her 
opinion about how much you transferred: Stingy. If you were given the possibility to alter 
your decision, how much would you keep from the total amount at your disposal (this choice 
will not affect you final profit)? 
 
Figure
 Figure 1: Means of donations in treatments C (gift C), O (Gift O), F (gift F) and intentions of 
donations (gift F’) 
Gifts C1 C2 O1 O2 F1 F2 
0 21.21 21.21 24.24 18.18 9.09 18.18 
1 30.30 24.24 24.24 30.30 15.15 9.09 
2 18.18 18.18 21.21 18.18 30.30 33.33 
3 24.24 24.24 24.24 21.21 21.21 27.27 
4 6.06 3.03 3.03 3.03 9.09 3.03 
5 0 3.03 0 9.09 6.06 3.03 
6 0 6.06 3.03 0 9.09 6.06 
Mann-Whitney test 
Prob>|z| 
 
 
0.49 
 
0.66 
 
0.78 
Gifts C O F 
0 21.21 21.21 15.15 
1 27.27 27.27 12.12 
2 18.18 19.70 30.30 
3 24.24 22.73 24.24 
4 4.55 3.03 6.06 
5 1.52 4.55 4.55 
6 3.03 1.52 7.58 
Mann-Whitney test 
Prob>|z| 
 
 
                                    0.888                                 0.037 
 
Table 1: Gifts in percentages in the treatments (with the Mann-Whitney tests of significance of the 
differences between the gifts) 
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Figure 2: Percentages of donations in the control treatment (gift C), in the observation-
only treatment (gift O) and the observation with feedback treatment (gift F) 
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Figure 3: percentages of the evaluation intensity of observers  
 
Figure 4: percentages of intentions of amount given and of the levels of (dis)approval 
of messages  
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